Article 679 of soc.culture.latin-america:
From: aem@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (a.e.mossberg)
Newsgroups: misc.headlines,soc.culture.latin-america
Subject: Nicaragua news 1/90 (forwarded from Peacenet)
Date: 1 Feb 90 14:55:36 GMT
Reply-To: carcmn%cdp.uucp@labrea.stanford.edu
Xref: tank misc.headlines:11965 soc.culture.latin-america:679

[forwarded from Peacenet conference carcmn.ens]

/* Written  1:46 pm  Jan 21, 1990 by carcmn in cdp:carcmn.ens */
/* ---------- "1/90 Nicaragua" ---------- */

***************************************************
EXECUTIVE NEWS SUMMARY, January 1990
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Nicaragua

Claudia Chamorro: Don't Vote for My Mother
[Claudia Lucia Chamorro Barrios, one of the children of UNO presidential
candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, has served as Nicaraguan Ambassador to
Costa Rica and is now serving in a diplomatic post in the Nicaraguan Embassy in
Spain.  She sent an open letter in response to numerous media inquiries about
her attitude toward her mother's candidacy.  Here are excerpts from that
letter.]

"In fact, I do not harbor the slightest doubts about my mother's democratic
convictions, nor her genuine desires for the welfare of Nicaragua.  ... And I
am even more sure of her fortitude, her integrity and her personal honesty.
She is deserving of all my love, consideration and respect.

"However, the political interests grouped together in UNO do not reflect
Nicaragua's truest interests in terms of its historical demands, its
independence or national sovereignty, or the desired socioeconomic equality
within a framework of democratic freedoms.  On the contrary, many of the
political sectors in UNO represent precisely the interests of the Somocista
past of oppression and injustice.  Some of them have been and continue to be
important mouthpieces of the United States policy, that for more than a century
has been imosing the most severe punishment on us: amidst a severe crisis whose
consequences are well known, they have dneied us the right ot peace and have
limited our chances for development.

"UNO brings together all the political enemies of my father, Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro. ...

"But even putting aside my political and ideological considerations, my
convictions, and my distrust stemming from what I have said above, I do not
believe in UNO's political effectiveness.  Its deep internal divisions, the
grudges between its leaders, the precarious unity it has shown, and the lack of
a program that can bring together the great majority of the Nicaraguan people,
do not earn for UNO the endorsement as an alternative that can guarantee
governability, security or stability for either Nicaragua or Central America.

"For all of these historical and political reasons, there is no doubt that the
Sandinista Front will obtain an unquestionable victory in the 1990 elections.
Hopefully, those who have done so much damage in the past will accept their
defeat honorably. ..."

UNO Defections
By mid-December, more than fifty UNO candidates for the National Assembly and
for municipal councils had formally renounced their candidacies.  Some wished
to disassociate themselves from UNO because of its perceived closeness to the
contras and to the ranks of the old Somocistas.  Others, including a father and
son from Masatepe, renounced following UNO violence in that city.  

Smaller numbers of candidates from other opposition parties have renounced
their candidacies as well, according to ENS staff interviews with UN observers
and officials of the Regional Electoral Commission in Len.  Many of the
smaller-party candidates renouncing have done so because they were not
consulted before being slated as candidates.  Neither UN nor Electoral
Commission officials were aware of any FSLN candidate renunciations.

In order to formally renounce candidacy, the candidate must contact the Supreme
Electoral Council in Managua.  Because one candidate and one alternate are
nominated for each available elected office, the renunciations will not result
in any shortage of candidates.  Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua), 12/16/89; ENS staff
interviews

Contras Kill Nuns, Other Nicaraguans
On January 1, a US nun and a Nicaraguan nun were killed in a contra attack on
the Atlantic Coast.  Another Nicaraguan nun and a US bishop riding with them in
a van were wounded in the attack.  Despite contra denials, few outside the Bush
administration expressed serious doubt about contra responsibility for the
attack.  Two local men who were eye-witnesses told Witness for Peace
investigators that they were abducted by a band of contras that afternoon and
taken to the road between Siuna and Rosita, where the contras planned to ambush
military vehicles.  When the van carrying the nuns and the bishop approached,
the contras attacked with a rocket-propelled grenade and automatic rifle fire.
The two men escaped during the attack.

This attack is the most prominent in the stepped-up contra activity since
election preparations began in Nicaragua.  Other recent incidents investigated
and reported by Witness for Peace include a December 11 attack on a farm north
of San Juan del Rio Coco, in which a farmer sympathetic to the Sandinistas was
killed, and contra intimidation of the president of an agricultural cooperative
in Jinotega.  The president, who also serves as an electoral official, said the
contras told him they knew that he was president of the cooperative and an
electoral policeman, stole his gun, threatened to kill him and his family,
stole money, and hit him in the chest before leaving.

According to Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense reports, the contras killed four
and wounded six people during the first four days of 1990.  In addition to the
nuns, the contras murdered a peasant who was organizing for the FSLN near La
Libertad, and killed another FSLN activist in the town of Jinotega.  Witness
for Peace, 12/28/89, 1/9/90; Nicanet, 1/5/90

Two Sides of the Berlin Wall
As the Berlin Wall crumbles, the two Western Hemispheric countries that are
governed by revolutionary socialist-oriented parties have reacted to the
changes in the socialist world in very different manners. While Cuban President
Fidel Castro has become an almost solitary bastion of the classic vanguard
party model of socialism, Nicaragua's Sandinista government has taken further
steps to reinforce a pluralistic political system while encouraging a mixed
economy.

Castro recently described the democratic openings and economic changes taking
place in the USSR, Hungary, Poland and East Germany as "very sad, incredible
things," and asserted that Cuba "will continue to defend socialism, no matter
what."

While Hungary, Poland and East Germany are moving toward multi-party political
systems, and the Soviet Union has relaxed restrictions on free expression,
Castro has continued to jail political opponents and recently banned the
publication or distribution of stories run in the liberal Moscow News.  While
the Cuban leader respects
 the decisions made by the people and governments of Eastern Europe, Castro
feels that perestroika, or economic restructuring, is, "for Cuba...contrary to
the principles of Marxism-Leninism."

Nicaragua, on the other hand, has praised the socialist renovation occurring in
the Soviet Union and other Eastdrn bloc nations, while proceeding with an
electoral process that includes a field of ten different political parties.
"Now the USSR is implementing a policy of broad freedom toward countries that
have been considered to be under its strategic influence," President Ortega has
said, "the U.S. must emulate the example of the USSR."  Despite the accusations
of Presidents Bush and Reagan that the Sandinista government is totalitarian
and resistant to the democratic tide supposedly sweeping Latin America and the
world, Nicaragua has been at least formally committed to a pluralistic
political system from the outset of its revolution.  Washington Report on the
Hemisphere, 12/6/89

Press Clips: Dis-Covering Nicaragua
28 year old Jason Bleibtreu, a photographer for the Sygma agency and a contract
field producer for the London-based Worldwide Television News was denied entry
into Nicaragua and hustled into a plane for Costa Rica on November 4, 1989.
Nicaraguan officials have accused him of being a "courier" for the contras.
Bleibtreu's video coverage has been used by CBS, ABC, and the MacNeil/Lehrer
Newshour on PBS, as well as his photos in Time , Newsweek,  Stern , and
Paris-Match.  He has covered Nicaragua since 1984.  Mary Speck, a stringer for
the Washington Post, US News and World Report, and NBC radio says that the
charge is "incredible" and relates an incident in which she and Bleibtreu were
fired on in contra territory two years ago.  The Committee To Protect
Journalists, whose directors include Dan Rather, John Seigenthaler, Mary
McGrory and Gil Noble, are urging his readmission.  Village Voice , 11/21/89.

The Vote in Nicaragua's Northeast
The prospects of a Sandinista victory on the Atlantic coast are not at all
clear.  The mistake, forced resettlements, etc., have left a bitter taste.
Were a simple plebiscite to be conducted, the Sandinistas would probably lose,
but so would any of the "Spaniards,' the non-Indian majority of Nicaragua.  The
UNO, whose platform contained only a minor reference to the Atlantic coast,
would probably fare no better.  

The coastal region is, however, much more interested in the legislative
assemblies which are to be formed in the North and South Atlantic Autonomous
Regions.  Each region is divided into 15 districts, each selecting three
delegates under a system of proportional representation guaranteeing
participation by the ethnic groups.  And voters can choose people rather than
parties, ensuring that they may vote for people whom they know rather than for
parties which they don't. 

Around Bluefields, the population is primarily Creole; in the north, around
Puerto Cabezas, it is Miskito.  The autonomy process is further along in the
South where the Creoles have had  longer access to education, professional
status, and political leadership. The North has been hindered by the contra
war, and the Sandinistas have seemed to lose interest in the area since the
conflict began to wind down.  The Sandinista presence in Puerto Cabezas is
mainly via the local police who are Creole and whom the local Miskitos see as
figureheads.  Local politics is dominated by two competing, social loyalty
tests: to the Sandinistas or to ethnic identity.  

The status of the electoral process will depend upon the status of the contra
war.   If conflict is renewed, Waslala, Waspam, and Leimus may be the only
voting centers along the Rio Coco.  The only way voters will be able to get to
the polls, in that event, is via government vehicles, and they may not be
willing to do that.  Christianity and Crisis , 11/6/89

UN Monitor Sees Threat to Vote in Rising Violence
Rising political violence was noted in a report issued on December 12 by
Elliott Richardson, the UN special representative monitoring the election
process.  Although the process of registering voters concluded "very
satisfactorily," Mr. Richardson expressed concern about the effect of the
increase in violence resulting in part from the resumption of military
operations after the suspension of the cease-fire on November 1.

The report stated that the number of contra attacks tripled during
registration, leading to the cease-fire abandonment.  Since then the Sandinista
army troop movements were observed but instead of large-scale offensive
operations, isolated actions designed to keep rebel units on the move and on
their bases were undertaken.

Although the report was compiled before the incident at Masatepe, Richardson
attributed several cases of violence at political rallies to "small groups of
UNO's opponents who are usually very young and who over-react to the
demonstrator's slogans."

Richardson also expressed concern about increasingly inflammatory tone of news
coverage of the campaign.  "Policy debates or genuine political proposals take
backstage to volleys of accusations and epithets ... The violence of language
used in the media and the manipulation of the news by the most important media
on both sides are alarming."  New York Times, 12/13/89

US Pollsters Find Ortega Leading
A new poll shows Daniel Ortega holding a 17% point lead over his chief
opposition, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.  The poll was sponsored by the
Boston-based group, Hemispheric Initiatives, and was conducted by
Greenberg-Lake between November 25 and December 3.  On the Atlantic coast, the
Nicaraguan organization Itztani conducted interviews for the survey.  

For the first time, a Nicaraguan poll used official voter registration lists as
a sampling base.  The survey was discussed with opposition and government
officials before proceeding, and full description of the methodology was
released.  Greenberg-Lake's predictions of the Paraguayan and Salvadoran
elections came within one or two points of the actual vote.  

Daniel Ortega and the FSLN received 44% versus 27% for UNO.  Five percent
distributed their support among the other parties, and 23% were undecided.  The
breakdown by electoral region was: 
Region I: FSLN 61% - UNO 9%
Region II: FSLN 47% UNO 26%
Region III: FSLN 44% - UNO 25%
Region IV: FSLN 34% - UNO 35%
Region V: FSLN 38% - UNO 46%
Region VI: FSLN 42% - UNO 26%
Atlantic Coast: FSLN 36% - UNO 13%

Other important points were: 77% of those polled believe that the parties are
free to campaign, 72% say that they are free to attend rallies, 72% believe
that the results of February 25's election will be honestly and accurately
reported, 62% of UNO supporter say they feel free to engage in politics, and
33% of UNO supporters said they did not feel free to do so.

The pollsters conclude that the most important issue for the voters is peace,
and that for those most concerned with peace, "there is considerably more trust
in the FSLN than the UNO to bring the war to a conclusion."  However, there is
more confidence in the UNO on the second major issue of the economy.  There is
a sizeable potential opposition bloc, with 41-45% of the voters saying they are
discontented with the present government.

Of those polled, 62% say that UNO is too close to the contras and that is the
single most serious problem for their election.  The contras get a negative
rating from 57% of those polled, and a positive response from only 10%,
although the electorate holds the US government, not the contras, responsible
for the war.  A near majority of voters believe that the FSLN's hostility to
the US prevents it from achieving peace, and one-third of FSLN supporters
believe they've been overly hostile.  "How President Ortega and the FSLN handle
this issue of war and peace relations with the US constitutes the most
important challenge if it is to win these elections in February," says
Greenberg.  Nicaline (Nicaragua), 12/21/89

Carter Praises Nica Election Council
At the home of Jack Leonard, US charge d'affaires in Managua, former President
Jimmy Carter told the diplomatic corps that he would be urging their respective
presidents and prime ministers to invest in Nicaragua once the outcome of free
and fair elections are known.

"The [Supreme Electoral Council's] actions have been without blemish.  I think
they've done a perfect job as far as I can ascertain, and they should be given
full support form UNO and others, who in the past have criticized them
excessively," Carter said.  "There have been about 110 decisions made by the
SEC.  I think all except five have been unanimous, and I've seen a report on
those five and they are not the kind of decisions that would adversely affect
the fairness of the elections."  Carter also criticized the pro-Sandinistas for
drawing constant connections between the UNO and the former National Guard of
Anastasio Somoza.  Nicaline (Nicaragua), 12/21/89

UN Report on the Electoral Process
The United Nations Nicaraguan Electoral Observer Mission has issued its second
report covering the months of October and November.  The forty-page document
compliments the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) for its "impartial and flexible
behavior," and says that the body, which is an autonomous arm of the Nicaraguan
government, "has been a keystone for guaranteeing the proper development of the
process in areas of its jurisdiction."

Thirty decisions were reached by the SEC between September 18 and November 1,
and all except one were agreed upon unanimously.  "No bias whatsoever towards
the governing party can be observed," says the report.  The policy of limiting
polling districts to 400 voters was complimented by the report, which stated:
"This decentralized system of 'neighborhood control' makes it difficult to
systematically engage in fraudulent registration."

The UN report notes that the number of complaints filed during the registration
period was high considering on-the-scene observations by UN and OAS officials.
"Many of the incidents denounced have little relevance and are impossible to
verify," the report says.  "It can also be supposed that complaints -- from the
perspective of each of the principal political forces -- are used as
instruments to disqualify the adversary and can also be used, at whatever
moment in the process, as a means to discredit the electoral process.  Within
the context of this strategy, complaints don't have to be relevant; they just
have to be numerous."

The report also commented on the Nicaraguan government's decision to end the
cease-fire with the contras, stating that "the perception of the (Nicaraguan)
government was that in spite of all the steps taken since the Costa del Sol
declaration, and five weeks from the (contra demobilization) date set by the
Central American presidents, no progress whatsoever had been made towards
contra demobilization.  On the contrary, (contras) had been infiltrating the
country, increasing their actions with the apparent objective of preventing the
normal development of the electoral process.  According to the government, its
declaration was determined by the fact that it had been trying everything
possible without receiving anything in return, and so concrete measures had to
be taken."  Nicaline (Nicaragua), 12/21/89

Masatepe Incident
A December 10th opposition demonstration in the town of Masatepe turned
violent, killing one and wounding 28.  The Organization of American States
(OAS) confirmed that the person killed was a Sandinista, not a member of UNO,
as UNO initially claimed.  The local Sandinista campaign headquarters and the
next-door daycare center were broken into and vandalized by a mob of UNO
supporters who also burned two vehicles, one of which belonged to the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization.

Both the Sandinistas and UNO, which organized the march, claimed that the other
side started the brawl.  The OAS report stated that "it is impossible to
determine who was responsible for initiating the violence."

Edgar Chamorro, ex-contra communications chief now working with former CIA
official David MacMichael for the New York, Washington, and Managua-based
Institute for Media Analysis, said that it was surprising how rapidly the US
press responded to the Masatepe violence with news pieces supporting UNO
claims.  "It indicates that a channel had been prepared and that it wasn't
something spontaneous," said Chamorro.

A delegation from the US Center for Democracy was at the demonstration.  The
group was led by Alan Weinstein, former head of the US National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) -- an organization that funnels millions of dollars to
Nicaraguan opposition groups.  The Center for Democracy also gave its "Sentinel
of Democracy" award to Violeta Chamorro in 1987.  Immediately after the
incident, the CFD delegation issued a statement from San Jose, Costa Rica
questioning the possibility of free elections in Nicaragua and charging
(falsely) that Sandinista activists had hacked opponents to death with
machetes.  CFD observers, although witnesses, made no mention of the UNO
rampage in their report.  The CFD statements were released as the five Central
American presidents were arriving in San Jose for a summit meeting, and were
also aired in the Washington Post.

In the wake of Masatepe, the country's various parties and alliances drafted an
accord to help insure against future violence.  All parties except UNO signed
the accord. Former US President Jimmy Carter expressed dismay at the UNO
refusal.  

The Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council (SEC)  issued a ruling in
mid-December, prohibiting the sale of alcohol during political demonstrations
and calling upon the police to intervene if violence arises.  The police
initially refused to intervene at Masatepe, claiming that they would be charged
with suppressing the demonstration.  The council also instructed police to
confiscate all arms or other potential weapons (sticks, iron bars, stones,
etc.) from any person within 200 meters of any political rally, and urged all
organizers to prevent their followers from carrying such objects.  

The SEC also instructed electronic and print media to desist from "insulting
and injurious behavior."  UNO has complained of references in the Sandinista
press that call the alliance the Guardia Nacional-UNO.  Nicaline (Nicaragua),
12/21/89; Witness for Peace, 12/14/89; Agendas International, 1/2/90

NED Involvement in Election Process
Details on how the NED is using the $9 million appropriated by the US Congress
for Nicaraguan electoral activities are emerging.  Most NED funds are being
funnelled through six Washington-based organizations:  the Delphi International
Group, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Institute
for Electoral Promotion and Training (IPCE), the National Democratic and
Republican Institutes (NDI and NRI), and the Free Trade Union Institute
(FTUI).

David MacMichael, an ex-CIA official and co-founder of the Institute for Media
Analysis, quoted an internal NED document which stated that "a set of
long-term, anti-Sandinista political and social institutions" are being
constructed with the $9 million.  "This is a possibly illegal use of
appropriated funds in the US," said MacMichael.  "Some NED documents make it
very clear that considerable effort and ingenuity has been used to disguise the
partisan support as permissible institutional development."

One of the ostensibly non-partisan bodies that the NED is supporting with
$220,000 is the Via Civica.  Via Civica is made up exclusively of UNO members
and is using the money to develop a system intended to allow UNO to announce
election results before the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council (SEC).  This
ability is portrayed as a guarantee against fraud, but, according to
MacMichael, "it is itself open to possible use as a device to provide an
alternate, arguably fraudulent figure and bring the legitimacy of the process
into question. ... In fact, all NED documents state or insinuate that the
electoral process is in fact illegitimate."

It is unclear how funds actually reach Nicaraguan opposition projects.  The UNO
claims that it has received nothing up to the end of December, and the Via
Civica has not declared receipt of its $220,000, according to the Nicaraguan
Exterior Ministry.  Internal NED documents speak of avoiding or minimizing
payments, taxes or import duties and, according to Paul Reichler, US attorney
for the Nicaraguan government, no funds have been channeled according to
Nicaraguan law since NED funding for the Nicaraguan opposition began in 1984.
The Nicaraguan government will forgive past irregularities, but is insisting
that the proper process (through the Central Bank and Exterior Ministry) be
followed now.  According to MacMichael, "What appears in the United States as
overt funding becomes covert in Nicaragua."  Nicaline (Nicaragua), 12/21/89

Nicaragua Shaping Risky New Strategy to Gain Leverage Against US
The November 1 suspension of the cease-fire and the November 25 missile
shipment to the Salvadoran rebels may signal a new Sandinista strategy to gain
leverage against the US.  Diplomats and officials close to the Sandinista
directorate say that the missile flight was approved as part of a calculated
attempt to establish a trade-off between Sandinista aid to Salvadoran
guerrillas and US aid to contra rebels.  The strategy is believed to have been
developed in late October as part of a broader set of military steps designed
to increase pressure for the dismantling of the contra army.

According to diplomats, the motivation for such measures is the Sandinista
government's increasing concern that the contra presence could endanger their
chances of winning the February elections or of asserting unchallenged control
in the event of victory.

Pairing the issues of Nicaraguan rebels with the Salvadoran guerrillas became a
central focus at the discussions held during the recent Central American summit
meeting.  New York Times, 12/7/89

Killing Nuns: Contra Deny But Clergy in Area Differ
A senior contra official denied that the rebels played any part in an attack
January 1 that killed two Roman Catholic nuns and injured a priest and another
nun.  But Catholic clergy based in the remote Atlantic coast region where the
attack occurred said that the area was known for contra activities and that
they had no doubt that the rebels were responsible.

The attack was one of the most serious recent actions attributed to the contras
and fueled renewed debate about the 3000 contra troops inside Nicaragua and
their impact on the February 25 elections.  New York Times, 1/4/90

[end of article from peacenet]

--
a.e.mossberg / aem@mthvax.cs.miami.edu / aem@umiami.BITNET /