------------------------------------------------------------------------------ the following appeared in the "VILLAGE VOICE," January 22, 1991 Slouching Toward Baghdad: How Diplomatic Bungling Brought Us to the Brink By Murray Waas ------------------------------------------------------------------ Let's Make This Perfectly Clear: What's a Border Dispute? Early on the morning of July 28, CIA director William Webster and a small contingent of aides--including Richard Stolz, the deputy director of operations--arrived at the White House to inform President Bush that they believed that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was imminent. But Webster told the president that the Iraqis were more likely to only annex the Rumaila oil fields and the two islands. To substantiate their claims, the CIA officials were armed with satellite photos showing Iraqi troops massed near the Kuwaiti border. Two CIA experts on satellite imaging accompanied Webster to the White House, in case Bush had detailed questions; but the president showed little interest. (A White House spokesperson refused to confirm or deny that such a briefing was ever held for the president. A spokesperson for the CIA, Mark Mansfield, told this reporter he could only say that the CIA furnished the White House with "very useful and timely information.") Despite Webster's personal warning, spokespersons for the Bush administration in the four days remaining before the invasion continued to insist the U.S. would remain neutral and not come to Kuwaits assistance. Then on July 31, just two days before the invasion, another senior official of the.Bush administration would leave little doubt with Saddam that the U.S. would not come to the rescue of Kuwait if it was attacked. The occasion was yet another appearance by Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly before House foreign affairs subcommittee. By this time, analysts at both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly had reached a consensus that some type of Iraqi military action against Kuwait was imminent, although there were disagreements as to whether Saddam was simply targeting the Rumaila oil fields and the two islands or the entire country. Despite this new assessment, Kelly told the congressmen in a prepared statement: "Historically, the U.S. has taken no position on the border disputes in the area, not on matters pertaining to internal OPEC deliberations." The subcommittee chairman, Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana), who opposed U.S. military intervention at he time, pressed Kelly more specifically: "I read a statement . . . in the press [in which] Secretary Cheney said the United States' commitment was to come to . . . Kuwait's defense if attacked. And I wondered if . . . I'm not sure that's an accurate statement, but that's what I read in the press. Perhaps you could clarify for me just what our commitment is." Asserting that he had never even heard of Cheney's statement, Kelly said: "We have no defense treaty relationship with any gulf country. That is clear. . . . We have not historically taken a position on border disputes." Hamilton pressed Kelly further, apparently to make sure the U.S. was not about to become involved in a war in the Persian Gulf: "If Iraq . . . charged across the border into Kuwait--what would be our position with regard to the use of U.S. forces? . . . It is correct to say, however, that we do not have a treaty commitment which would obligate us to engage U.S. forces there?" "That is correct." Kelly responded. Whatever little doubt, whatever slight ambiguity existed about the U.S. position on an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait was now gone, thanks to the public statement of a senior Bush administration policymaker. Two days later, Iraqi troops crossed the border into Kuwait.