From MATHRICH%UMCVMB.bitnet@DARTCMS1.DARTMOUTH.EDU Mon Feb 11 01:47:01 1991 Return-Path: <@DARTCMS1.DARTMOUTH.EDU:ACTIV-L@UMCVMB.BITNET> Date: Fri, 8 Feb 91 17:56:56 CST Reply-To: Rich Winkel UMC Math Department Sender: Activists Mailing List From: Rich Winkel UMC Math Department Subject: Proceso news from ES: "All aid to the army" To: Multiple recipients of list ACTIV-L /** reg.elsalvador: 215.1 **/ ** Written 12:01 pm Feb 7, 1991 by cidai in cdp:reg.elsalvador ** PROCESO 460 January 30, 1991 [ Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions will be sent in English to the reg.elsalvador conference of PeaceNet. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication. Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$35.00 (Americas) or $40.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to Apdo. Postal (01)575, San Salvador, El Salvador. Computerized searches of Proceso (1980-present) by keyword are available upon request. ] Editorial: All aid to the army It came of little surprise when President Bush notified Congress of his decision to release the military aid funds, withheld from the Salvadoran army scarcely twelve weeks earlier as a way to show support for the U.N.-sponsored peace talks and promote the rule of justice in El Salvador. Ever since the Senate overwhelmingly passed the bill to withhold and condition 1991 military aid, everyone knew that the Bush Administration was getting ready to release it. Although the murder of two U.S. military advisers by the FMLN in Lolotique was not cited as the specific reason behind Bush's decision, it is clear that the State Department was able to utilize it to the advantage of the poorly-supported report issued to justify U.S. war strategy. Secretary Baker himself told the press in person that the U.S. would respond to the crime by delivering the aid to the Salvadoran army. A balanced and unbiased study of the objectives and conditions contained in the Congressional appropriations bill which restricted delivery of the military aid funds would have dictated a less hasty and prejudiced attitude than the one taken by the Bush Administration. Above all, it would have been necessary to place a greater level of trust in and commitment to the U.N.-sponsored negotiating process. Peace, the administration of justice, and respect for human rights have not made an iota of progress after eleven years of war in El Salvador. And the United States would like to be seen as a fervent proponent of negotiations by giving the talks two months to progress before throwing itself with abandon into the delivery of more bombs and weapons to the Salvadoran army. Even so, the biggest problem is not so much in the delivery of those weapons, or in that the U.S. stubbornly insists upon their usefulness in pressuring the insurgents to negotiate in good faith, but rather in that the Bush Administration once again is placing its own views of affairs before mediation -this time involving the U.N.; before, it was Esquipulas II, Contadora, etc.- by threatening to remove all credibility from that organization. Without saying so duly and explicitly, however, this Congressional appropriations bill made the negotiations a central point, basing compliance with its conditions upon the talks as a way to verify the good faith of both sides in reaching a negotiated settlement. The same was done with military offensives, violations of the rights of civilians, or the willingness of the Salvadoran government and armed forces to bring the masterminds of the UCA massacre to justice. As early as December, the U.N. Secretary General reported that the talks "have run into considerable problems in reaching an agreement on the armed forces, which is the most complex and delicate issue on the agenda." There are increasingly more solid reasons and powerful evidence to conclude that the principal source of these problems is the Armed Forces' demonstrated resistance to purging its ranks and restructuring the institution in anything more than purely cosmetic terms. As we have said from the start, if the Salvadoran army obstructs and prevents the truth and the administration of justice in a case in which it defies the entire international community, as in the UCA case, it is useless and absurd to expect it to behave more honestly in discussing the fate of the very same murderers when confronted with FMLN demands to purge its ranks. To corroborate the involvement of other higher-ranking 'intellectual authors' in the massacre and verify the criminal concealment in which the Salvadoran army High Command has made such great efforts, it would be enough to proceed with a minimal level of honesty and take the trouble to read the memorandum issued earlier this year by the Moakley Task Force. It is even more troublesome that the Task Force, which once trusted Cristiani's sincerity, has finally been disappointed by the fact that "President Cristiani has proven either unwilling or unable" to obtain military cooperation in bringing to justice all those responsible for the massacre. Cristiani himself, who three months ago offered Congress all possible guarantees that justice would be done in the case, has turned out to be part of the cover-up, not only on a sporadic basis but instead systematically, by not turning over vital information in his power to the judge: during four months he concealed the existence of the document given to him by the Armed Forces Honor Commission; during eight months he kept silent about the fact that he had authorized the search of the Jesuit residence which paved the way for the massacre; and a year after seeing a videotape containing Major Buckland's most important statements about plans to kill the Jesuits, he has yet to explain why he said nothing about it to the presiding judge and why he did not say all he knew about the case when he made his highly publicized appearance before the judge. Such conduct would merit legal proceedings against an elected official in any country where justice was worthy of the name. If such is the behavior of the President of the Republic in a case in which the credibility of his government is at stake, we can better understand the difficulties and obstacles placed in the path of the public prosecutors, who deserve recognition for what little credibility the case had achieved. The most recent obstacle placed in the path of the two attorneys before their almost forcible resignation was precisely their de facto removal from the UCA case, when they were assigned the case of the two slain U.S. servicemen. An intelligent and honest reading of the abovementioned Congressional bill also shows that its most forceful clause is the one which discusses the possibility of completely cutting off military aid, including the 50% which was not initially withheld, in case there were anomalies in the investigation and trial of the UCA case. Nevertheless, this provision was the first one the State Department proceeded to sabotage by speeding up delivery of the available half of the aid, only so that one month later, with the support of completely one-sided interpretations of FMLN behavior, the army could be awarded the withheld funds as well. But in the end, no other behavior could really be expected from the Bush Administration, which recently confessed that turning over secret documents which could lead to the identities of the masterminds behind the UCA massacre could jeopardize the policies which it promotes and funds in El Salvador. This is not an argument for overlooking the fact that the FMLN's acquisition of sophisticated weaponry also violated one of the conditions set forth in the aid bill. For the negotiations, however, the important and beneficial effects of the measures taken by the Nicaraguan army and government, which guarantee the total elimination of such practices in the future, far outweigh the negative effects which could result from the use of the unused weapons still remaining in the hands of the FMLN. The return of the missiles virtually invalidates any of the reasons given by the Bush Administration for increasing the Salvadoran army's firepower. It is also true that the FMLN has launched serious military campaigns, although they are no less intense or prolonged than those mounted by the Armed Forces. The actions of both armies have caused damage and death to civilians, although one must recognize (as did the Auxiliary Bishop of San Salvador) that both sides made conspicuous efforts to prevent the military actions from producing civilian victims and to minimize damage to civilian property. Although the human rights violations committed by both sides are serious, and an overall evaluation of the human rights situation leaves little room for optimism (Cf. Proceso 457), even more serious is the way in which the report used by the Bush Administration to justify the release of the aid actually promotes the Armed Forces' war and impunity by listing the violations in a distorted and partial manner. The restoration of the entire sum of military aid to the Salvadoran army is certainly no coup de grace for the FMLN, but rather a well-aimed shot at the battered judicial system, as well as a low blow to the U.N.-sponsored peace talks which, together with the UCA case, have become a serious hindrance to U.S. policy toward El Salvador. ** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **