- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Draft of an article I started to write in response to an alt.activism.d attack against a Chomsky article about the Gulf War [This draft written May '91] Use GET command on GULF-WAR CHOMSKY Documents: policy aims:avert peaceful resolution for said Chomsky article. A better (more up to date) article is: POST-WAR TEACH-IN MUST READ.Documents:rejecting nonviolent resolutn Also available with the GET command ====================================== To get a file named FILE NAME from the archiver (files are two words separa- ted by a space), send the 1-line message GET FILE NAME ACTIV-L to: LISTSERV@UMCVMB.BITNET [or: LISTSERV@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU] ====================================== Use GET with the file ACTIV-L ARCHIVE for a listing of files available with the GET command. e.g., send GET ACTIV-L ARCHIVE ACTIV-L to LISTSERV@UMCVMB.BITNET to be emailed the index of archived files. --HB Feb '92 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NC: Rejection of diplomacy was explicit from the outset. New York NC: Times chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman (in effect, NC: the State Department voice at the Times) attributed the NC: Administration's rejection of "a diplomatic track" to its concern NC: that negotiations might "defuse the crisis" at the cost of "a few NC: token gains in Kuwait" for the Iraqi dictator, perhaps "a Kuwaiti NC: island or minor border adjustments" (August 22). Anything short NC: of capitulation to U.S. force is unacceptable, whatever the NC: consequences. Arguments given (in attack): (1)This is "appeasement" (2)Why should we "reward ..invasion..with border adjustments?" (3)Anything less than an unconditional withdrawal IS unacceptable (4)Why be concerned about consequences "for the aggressor"? (not victim?) [Ie, "Chomsky is"] (5)U.S. hypocritical, but why should Kuwait suffer for that? NC: Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, then, the NC: possible contours of a diplomatic settlement appeared to be these: NC: Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S. pledge not NC: to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops leave the region; the NC: Security Council indicates a serious commitment to settle other NC: major regional problems. Disputed border issues would be left for NC: later consideration. Once again, we cannot evaluate the prospects NC: for settlement along these -- surely reasonable -- lines, because NC: the offers were flatly rejected, and scarcely entered the media or NC: public awareness. The United States and Britain maintained their NC: commitment to force alone. (A) Iraq would have "gained leadership of the Arab world" leading to a "bloody showdown" between states "willing to [take] Iraqi dictation" and those not. (B) Also "acknowledg[ing] some connection between [Palestinian issues] and the Iraqi occupation" would have made Iraq "leaders of the Arab world" (C) Iraq needed to withdraw "in complete humiliation" and "having achieved precisely NOTHING" or else "within a few years" we would have "the Arab world..faced with a major war between an Iraqi led bloc and an Egyptian/Syrian/Saudi bloc," a war which "would have been IMMENSELY more destructive than the one that actually occurred." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (D)"Endorsing the belief that `Iraq invaded Kuwait to help the Palestinians' is PRECISELY what [Chomsky] describes as `reasonable'" Also shall we support "a peoples war against Zionism and imperialism" or hoping for "libera[tion] by a fascist strongman messiah?" "100,000's were already [supporting] this fascist..when he..achieved nothing" imagine "the menace he would be if there was actually some CREDIBILITY attached to [his claims of speaking for the oppressed]?" (E) "The next time Iraq wanted to make a point, it would only have to invade another country ... [or threaten/hint]" (F) It is a "mystery" why the "Iraqi Government chose to withdraw" in "complete humiliation" only after the "crushing military defeat" when they were "offered doing so BEFORE that was inflicted on them [sic]" ################################################################## The arguments, in essence, boil down to: Washington ("we") had "no choice" but to insist on "unconditional " surrender in "total humiliation" otherwise this would be "appeasement" making "Kuwait suffer" and giving Iraq "leadership of the Arab world" who would have admired it, and/or terrorizing the rest of the Arab world into submission, leading to "IMMENSELY more destructive" war(s) within "a few years," etc. ################################################################## First, Saddam Hussein's personal willingness to invade other countries was no different a year (or five) ago, when he was a U.S. ally, than it was on August 2 -- and, it is not different today -- after the war. The nooz-media and Washington would have us remain unconcerned with -- or better, ignorant of -- this dictator so long as he is sufficiently obedient to washington's desires; then have us overnight turn to condemning the "Hitler," wearing Saddam "WANTED: Dead or dead" T-shirts, and other achievements of our Free Press. Human rights organizations, the peace movement, the kurds, and the Iraqi opposition have long been aware of Saddam's record and condemned it when it was not "fashionable" to do so. It is these groups who were, during the propaganda-assault leading to the military one, condemned as Saddam-lovers/appeasers; or, if that assertion was too ludicrous even for Washington, effectively ignored. During another recent and vicious invasion, that of Panama by the Bush Administration ("we"), Noam Chomsky was one of the few (if not only) who pointed out, at that time, that on the day of the invasion, just as Washington was rationalizing its violence with high-sounding rhetoric about it's deep love for Democracy and Human Rights, it had announced new credits for Iraq (and China); few if any other commentators bothered to note this condemnation of Noriega's record while cozying up to Hussein, someone next to whom Noriega looks like "a boy scout." The analogies with the Panama invasion include the same pretenses that all is fine -- so long as Noriega was obedient, cooperating with the CIA in it's war against Nicaragua, subverting the Canal Treaty [1] by allowing its use in providing assistance for that band of terrorists [Send the 1-line message GET CONTRA TERROR ACTIV-L to: LISTSERV@UMCVMB.BITNET for ample documentation] from the Canal Zone etc; when he was no longer useful and cooperative, we again had a sudden transformation of Noriega into a media-oversized arch-demon, for a TV viewing public now ready to don the "WANTED" T-shirts and condemn the longtime CIA "asset" as dangerous thug, whose abuses "we" somehow failed to note before, but now that we suddenly have, our service to the world will be to violently remove him. That the U.S. had long supported the dictator, has a long and unmistakable record of supporting dictators -- when not outright putting them into power in subverting democracies -- many of whom indeed make Noriega look like a "boy scout," with their Washington-backed mass-slaughter and infamous massacres ; never mind that the CIA (formerly headed by Bush) long knew of their "asset's" involvement in drugs (which was ok; after all, he was involved in far worse: supporting terrorism against Nicaragua; but then that was the point); the contras' drug-running, with planes shipping guns one way, to the "freedom fighters" who were well known to "routinely attack civilian populations," and "kidnap, torture, and murder health workers, teachers, and other government employees" (Americas Watch), explicitly following the State Department's definition of "terrorism," while planes heading the other direction ran drugs into American cities; nor the absurdity of the rationalization for the invasion as making any significant difference in the "drug war" -- none of this mattered, and similarly the absurdity of the rationalizations for the brutality inflicted upon the Iraqi people -- and indirectly the Kuwaiti people, since the alternative, sane policy would likely have spared much suffering there too -- did not matter either. Neither does logic matter when you have a sufficiently compliant media, so when we consider arguments for the use of force which are based on the pressing need to stop the killing of Kuwaitis, we need not consider that the predictable consequences of these policies of force are the far more massive slaughter visited upon Iraq and Kuwait and there people are as a result of Washington's "blocking the diplomatic track," just as Chomsky says (and documents further in other articles). And Washington must always convince us, while ignoring and understating the devastation and slaughter its preferred strategies affect, that the alternatives (regional autonomy from the superpowers and diplomatic resolutions, which are far more likely when leaders cannot depend on continued armaments for butchers and ayatollahs regardless of their records from the U.S. and others, and when U.S. supports rather than undermining sanctions in most cases) would have (somehow) meant even worst outcomes, even more destruction, even more slaughter. We are to believe this even now after the slaughter of 1-200,000 Iraqis, the increased terror in Kuwait as a result of the war, the slaughter U.S.-encouraged Kurds now ignored, etc; just as we were told the same -- the alternatives would have (somehow) been *even bloodier* had "we" not, earlier, "fought against Iran" (in other words, directly supported the Butcher of Baghdad in his invasion of Iran) to whom "we" were coincidentally sending armaments as well while declaring it "terrorist" thus doing a considerable job of maximizing and promoting slaughter on both sides of (some darker-skinned, non-American people). Just as with the aiding of the slaughter of Iraqis and Iranians while supporting the Butcher of Baghdad, and just as with the mass-slaughter of Iraqis and policies allowing more Kuwaitis and Kurds, not less, to die, so we will be told, the next time, that the mass-murder is all too necessary, and that the chaotic alternatives would have been far worse, as "we" continue to do the work of the Grim Reaper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - There are, fortunately, increasingly many people who recognize that the U.S. has been "hypocritical" and indeed many today see through the nonsense about upholding Democracy, Human Rights, Fighting Drugs, and other Nobel Goals asserted when the leadership in Washington finds it necessary to increase public support for otherwise abhorrent policies, or at least to minimize the effects of the peace movement. However, the suppression of much relevant information in the mainstream noozmedia, and the virtual lack of genuinely -- not nominally -- alternative policy analysis leave many with a disillusioning picture, recognizing the hollowness of Washington's rhetoric, and fallaciousness of the declared motives, but not able to fully recognize the actual motives very clearly, or recognize the actual, existing alternatives to the policies marketed on TV, thus leaving us with a "tough world" with "harsh realities" and "difficult decisions," for Washington; a picture which does little more to illuminate the real world than the did the viewpoint of blind faith in Our Leaders' efforts to promote Democracy and Human Rights, throughout the world (from where we all started), thus leaving us feeling that nonetheless we "had no choice," due to other considerations and "concerns" (less transparently mendacious than the High Rhetoric), but which impede equally unjustifiably a sane policy instead of slaughter, and equally impede our understanding of the world. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Let's start then with these second-generation concerns, then, and look at the issue of the threat of future invasions by Iraq (or others), and the "logic" of invasions in general. We are to believe that it is the "policeman" function of principally the United States that is the deterrent to aggression and lawlessness in the world, teaching evil-doers everywhere "lessons" so that they learn to behave civilly. In the real world, however, the "enforcement" is neither consistent (as many concede), nor is it international law or peace which is "enforced" at all, but rather the wishes of the powerful (again principally the U.S.), be these wishes for or against violence. At once the objection is raised that if the U.S. (and other nations to be sure) have been hypocritical, this is no reason to let Saddam -- not Hitler with his TV-exaggerated powers, but a "murderous gangster" (Chomsky) nonetheless -- have his brutal way. Before examining the non-violent alternative resolutions of the Gulf Crisis which were possible, and which would have actually done more, not less, to "stop Saddam" and alleviate Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) suffering, we need to understand what, in the real world, allows and deters invasions; specifically, let's address the issue of the alleged threat of future intimidation by Saddam had we not slaughtered 100,000+ Iraqis. It is indeed true that "Naked Aggression," in the real world, is not tolerated; only "Properly Attired Aggression" (E.S. Herman) is tolerated -- and often encouraged. We have seen time and time again that violence is perfectly acceptable to the U.S. if it serves "our" (Washington's) interest, while violence that is not in our interest -- or for that matter, nonviolent change which does not please Washington and its geopolitical and economic "interests," as was the case with the democratically elected Arbenz in Guatemala (CIA organized coup, 1954), Nicaragua in the 1980's [Send 1-line GET ACTIV-L ARCHIVE ACTIV-L message to LISTSERV@UMCVMB.BITNET and see the Nicaragua section for ample documentation of who the "bad guys" were], and so on, is not tolerated, and is unacceptable. Consider the President's proud boast that *dictators and tyrants* know "that what we say goes." It is beyond dispute that the US has no problem with dictators and tyrants if they serve US interests, and will attack and destroy committed democrats if they depart from their service function. The correct reading of Bush's words, then, is: "What we say goes," whoever you may be. [2] Note, however, that there is more to this situation than grand hypocrisy: the "lessons" learned in the world, then, are not that the U.S. will not tolerate violence and aggression, but that it will be tolerated if, and only if, it is "properly attired" and agreeable to the "policemen" of the world (essentially, the United States) and their national interests. The consequences of all this are predictable: those dictators (and elected leaders) the world over who see violence as acceptable understand well that they may use this "tool" to their advantage so long as they are careful that the violence in question does not upset Washington; crucially, not interfering with Washington's "domains," intruding into or diminishing its economic or geo-political "interests," etc. These dictators and leaders include the post-war Saddam Hussein. There is no question but that Saddam believed his aggression was "properly attired" and would be tolerable to Washington -- just as his aggression against Iran was tolerable -- indeed, supported and funded by the U.S.; just as his treatment of the Kurds (or Turkey's treatment of Kurds for that matter), or massacres of peasants in Central America by U.S.-proped regimes, or the genocide in East Timor [3], the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua, and so on, had been quite tolerable and usually directly supported by Washington, so long as these were useful as far as Washington's goals, "our [sic] interests" were concerned, that political and economic domination and exploitation in our "domains" is left unruffled. The "signals" Saddam received from Washington -- from Dole's apology for Voice of America criticisms of Saddam's regime, saying it was not indicative of the administration's views, to Ambassador Glaspie's "we have no opinion on border disputes" such as that between Iraq and Kuwait following Saddam's explicit articulation of his views and intentions [4] -- whether or not they were an intentional ploy to gain greater control over oil and/or leverage over Germany/Japan, boost up the Military Industrial Complex, re-assert U.S. global dominance by military force and smash lingering hopes for a "Peace Dividend," divert attention from the S&L scandal and general deterioration at home, etc; whether or not this was part of a deliberate plan to "lure him," [5] Saddam understood that his plans of dealing with the problems Kuwait was causing him with violence would fall under the category of "properly attired aggression." This act of violence by Saddam, not the first by him or others, was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of state violence which is predictably encouraged as result of a world policy -- enforced by the U.S. with occasional help from allies -- which instead of uniting against violence(*), openly accepts it, and often encourages it, when this serves their interests, so that the lessons learned by world leaders and dictators is not "thou shalt not use violence" but "thou shall or shall not use violence as you please, so long as thou dost not do anything (violent or not) which interferes with the interests of the global policemen) Washington's policy also does a good deal to encourage invasions and world violence because Saddam knew, and still today knows (as do others) that brutality and slaughter do not mean an end to the gravy train of military hardware which Bush's contractor friends are so eager to sell, just as Saddam's bloody record did not impede earlier U.S. support, nor the Ayatollah's record, nor in countless other regions and cases too numerous to mention without getting far afield. And Washington's preferential option for brute force does too a fair deal to help Saddam (and others like him) win "converts" who see this type of local tyranny as preferable to external domination, and domination by a power whose past actions demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt that the lives of the locals mean nothing, and economic exploitation of regional resources and geopolitical interests mean everything. [(*) Such a united stand against violence would itself be non-violent, sanctions and diplomatic pressure being powerful weapons -- devastating in fact in a world united to deprive Saddam of such "ideological fig leaves" as the Palestinian issue, disarmament in the middle-east as a whole, etc; it is hardly a "reward" to tyrants to institute policies which benefit all and which are in any case important steps towards peace, justice, and regional disarmament, security, and stability (in the true sense of the word, not the usual reference to things going along with "our" interests) -- good ideas on their own; moreover, depriving Saddam of this fig leaf is impossible precisely under the present rejectionism, with Saddam clearly having "tried" for the Palestinians but having met with violence despite his "efforts" rather than had his bluff called; and not when we deprive Saddam of his fig-leaf, precisely when we "give in" -- to peace and justice, regional stability and security for all, and so on -- as the inverted logic from Washington goes. We can also consider, in weighing the violent route taken against the road to regional peace and security, and ignoring for a moment the countless lives lost and destruction causes which the later would have prevented, how Saddam might have looked had we "given in" to justice for the Palestinians and regional disarmament, "given in" to diplomacy over matching violence with (far greater) violence, and allowed "linkage" to these issues of peace, regional security and justice which Washington professes to be after. In the real world, Arabs are not stupid. They recognize Saddam to be the tyrant that he is. It is only *our* blindness to *U.S. tyranny* which makes the reaction of many in the Arab world so puzzling -- be it genuine support for his leadership --tyrannic though it is-- against U.S. tyranny, or be it opposition to both Saddam's violence and U.S. violent intervention, which can be painted on TV as "pro-Saddam" (despite quite explicit condemnation of Saddam's invasion in Palestinian statements) -- as Chomsky documents, as for what would have been truly "puzzling," the unmistakably and vehemently anti-Saddam Iraqi opposition groups (and members of the Kuwaiti democratic opposition) and their positions against the U.S. position and for a non-violent diplomatic resolution leading to regional disarmament and security -- these were politely ignored by the press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Very quickly Saddam realized that this was not the case, that he went farther than was ok and that his aggression was not "properly attired" after all, and so, being rational, like most dictators, sought a way out. This was the diplomatic track which was anathema to Bush, for reasons having nothing to do with the rhetoric about Democracy, Human Rights and other High Principles. The rest of the story was quite predictable from this point on but first, let's be clear about the lessons of violence. As pointed out, the High Principles of law are selectively upheld, thus promoting violence and aggression worldwide wherever and whenever these are guessed at by democrats and dictators -- correctly or erroneously -- to be "properly attired" and acceptable to the Policeman. This situation, clearly, has not changed. The lesson for the world from Washington is "don't step on our toes," not for the first time. Clearly "properly attired" aggression by South Africa [6], Indonesia, Israel, can continue, and leaders know have little to fear from Washington so long as they remain Properly Attired. Indeed, Saddam himself is as free as ever to engage in aggression, several 100,000 slaughtered Iraqis (and many Kuwaitis; both bloodbaths very likely largely preventable were it not for the rejection of the nonviolent resolution) The lessons of Bush's war are that Might Makes Right -- and in the U.N., the "golden rule" (he who has the gold, makes the rules) -- and that brute force and violence, not international cooperation, sanctions, and diplomacy, are the rule in the New World Order. Why not? After all, the U.S. is #1 in the arena of force so maintaining this as the prime arena for "resolving" disputes as well as crises is advantageous to "our" interests, whereas promoting regional cooperation and resolution of conflict by local nations, U.N. mediation, sanctions, demilitarization of the region (thus depriving the U.S. economy and the Military-Industrial Complex of the key driving force Washington has come to rely on for "growth"), resolving issues of peace and mutual security for all nations and justice for all peoples (just reducing the U.S. role, dependence on the U.S. for "protection" etc) would have diminished Washington's "influence" (another term normally being applied when the Soviet Union played that game) The conclusions drawn the world over from Bush's war and its (real) "lessons" this are not difficult to imagine. What emerges clearer than ever is the fact that democracy in Kuwait, or the plight of the Kurds (in Iraq or elsewhere), or Saddam the dictator in power in Iraq, are not important concerns. The Butcher of Baghdad may stay in power, slaughter Kurds, keep his weapons, now that he has learned the (real) lessons of the War -- "don't step on our toes." And Saddam most reasonably can expect that future aggression on his part will be quite tolerable if not supported by Washington so long as he is more careful that it is in Washington's interests ("properly attired") as had his aggression against Iran, and as he mistakenly thought his aggression against Kuwait was, and as had been countless other instances of aggression tolerated -- often directly sponsored -- by Washington. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Predictability of outcome (incl Saddam's belief;sv face; propaganda in Iraq etc so no "humil"; "humil"=slaughter, not of Saddam -How 100,000 Iraqis, plus kuwait suffer, could probly have been prevented. -Disarmament and Saddam; clearly, now, never a serious goal; the way would have been to... -Noam Chomsky documents the diplomatic opportunities, all rejected, as well as near-unanimous opposition to force (re :"predictable from this point on") (*mark*) re Bush's real motives and why PREDICTABLE (see "unexplained") at his critique of NC, at the end of it... [Chomsky Teach-in re Kuwait/Iraq democ. opposition] and "If *I* were president" ################################################################## [1] "Even more significant, under the rule of Noriega Panama was extraordinarily tolerant of whatever the U.S. Southern Command cared to do with its forces in the Canal Zone. From the Zone the Southern Command trained and supplied the contras, spied on Nicaragua, coordinated air strikes in El Salvador, and contributed logistic support for the invasion of Grenada, all activities in clear violation of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties which restrict the bases in the zone to the defense of the canal." _Report on the Americas_, July/Aug. '88, NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America). when this relationship soured,... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [2] Noam Chomsky, May 1991, Z magazine, who had written in the earlier, Feb. '91 article excerpted on the net earlier that In brief, like other states, the U.S. will do what it chooses, regarding law and principle as ideological weapons, to be used when serviceable, to be discarded when they are a nuisance. We do no one any favors by suppressing these truisms. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [3] "We have taken the view since 1979 that whatever the unhappy circumstances and indeed, possible illegality, surrounding Indonesia's acquisition of East Timor in the 1970s, Indonesian sovereignty over the territory should be accepted not only on a de facto basis but on a de jure basis. There is no binding legal obligation not to recognise acquisition of territory that was acquired by force". [Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, Senate Daily Hansard, 1 November 1989] See "reg.seaais" conference ("newsgroup") on PeaceNet, Feb 21 1991, "East Timor Briefing Document" Use GET with EASTIMOR INTRO regarding the genocidal proportions and oil-profit motives concerning the situation there and U.S./Australian reactions. ====================================== To get a file named FILE NAME from the archiver (files are two words separa- ted by a space), send the 1-line message GET FILE NAME ACTIV-L to: LISTSERV@UMCVMB.BITNET [or: LISTSERV@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU] ====================================== - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [4] This statement by Glaspie followed Saddam's explicit articulation of his views, that Kuwait's actions were considered acts of war against Iraq by his regime, that "When planned and deliberate policy forces the price of oil down without good commercial means, then that means another war against Iraq [...] Military war kills people, but economic war kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living." Later, Saddam warned Glaspie, "Yours is a not society which can accept 10,000 dead in one battle." Incredible as it now seems, the American ambassador had no forceful words to discourage Saddam from invading Kuwait. Instead, the transcript shows, even as Saddam was making his intentions known, Glaspie was openly expressing sympathy for his attitude toward Kuwait. "We studied history at school," Glaspie told him. Then she compared his plight to that of America's Founding Fathers. "They taught us to say, `Freedom or death.' I think you know well that we as a people have our own experience with colonialists." With Glaspie continuing on to reassure him she had orders directly from Bush to seek better relations following Saddam's list of grievances (real and imagined) against Kuwait and the U.S. and his angry outbursts. [See Village Voice, 1/22/91 or online version posted to ACTIV-L] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [5] Clearly, even if there was no intentional luring of Saddam to invade, these considerations and "interests" came into play once Kuwait had been invaded. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [6] As Chomsky writes in "The Victors" part II, a study of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa estimates that "South Africa's military aggression and destabilization of its neighbors cost the region $10 billion in 1988 and over $60 billion and *1.5 million lives in the first nine years of this decade."* Such figures are considered too insignificant to merit notice in the Newspaper of Record, which avoided the matter. Use GET with the file CHOMSKY VICTORS2 for the full article. ################################################################## Must address: future(another)invasion ; wars ; intimidation;arabs'-ldr also Kuwaitee suffering Must convey basic understanding of: